

# BACKGROUND GUIDE

## UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Addressing Iran-Israel-USA tensions and threats to international peace and security, including pathways for post-conflict disarmament.



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## ***Letter of the Executive Board***

**Dear Delegates,**

It is our pleasure to welcome you to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at the 3rd Edition of Nashik Youth Model United Nations. The agenda for this committee is: *Addressing Iran–Israel–USA tensions and threats to international peace and security, including pathways for post-conflict disarmament.*

Distinguished delegates, this agenda focuses on one of the most sensitive and important conflicts in global politics today. The growing tensions between Iran, Israel, and the USA have raised serious concerns about regional stability, international peace, nuclear security, and humanitarian impact. As members of the Security Council, your role will be to discuss these challenges carefully and work towards practical and peaceful solutions.

Delegates are encouraged to think about ways to reduce tensions, prevent further conflict, strengthen diplomacy, and explore realistic methods for post-conflict disarmament and long-term peace. This committee will require balanced debate, strong research, and effective negotiation skills.

We urge you to carefully go through the background guide and research the countries involved, as this will help you build informed arguments and participate confidently during committee sessions. We are confident that your discussions will be engaging, productive, and insightful.

Best of luck, and we look forward to seeing your ideas and diplomacy in committee.

Warm regards,

Executive Board

United Nations Security Council

Nashik Youth Model United Nations – 3rd Edition

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## ***INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE***

The United Nations Security Council is the UN body charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under Chapter V and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Articles 39 through 42 empower the Council to determine threats to peace and take enforcement measures, including the use of armed force under Article 42. Member states are obligated to accept and carry out the Council's decisions under Article 25.

The Iran–Israel–USA conflict directly implicates:

- Article 2(4): The prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state
- Article 51: The right of individual or collective self-defence, which both the US and Iran have invoked
- Articles 39-42 (Chapter VII): Authority to determine threats to international peace and security and take enforcement measures
- Article 25: The obligation of member states to accept and carry out Security Council decisions
- NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty): The foundational disarmament and non-proliferation legal framework
- JCPOA and UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015): The now-collapsed nuclear agreement framework

## ***INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA***

The agenda before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) represents a pivotal moment in contemporary international relations. The committee is tasked with addressing the "Iran–Israel–USA Tensions," a conflict that evolved from long-standing regional friction into a full-scale kinetic engagement on February 28, 2026. This agenda is not merely a regional border dispute; it is a systemic threat to international peace and security that encompasses nuclear

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proliferation, freedom of navigation in international waterways, and the erosion of established norms surrounding the use of pre-emptive force.

The committee is currently operating in the shadow of "Operation Epic Fury," a military campaign that has fundamentally altered the security architecture of the Middle East. By the time this committee convenes, the international community faces the dual challenges of managing a fragile, indefinite ceasefire while attempting to construct a durable, long-term framework for regional disarmament.

This agenda requires delegates to address five distinct, yet interconnected, pillars of the current crisis:

1. **Legal Justifications of Military Action:** Evaluating the legality of the February 28, 2026, strikes under the UN Charter, specifically the tension between Article 2(4) (prohibition of the use of force) and Article 51 (the right of self-defense), particularly in the context of "pre-emptive" or "anticipatory" self-defense.
2. **The Nuclear Proliferation Paradigm:** Addressing the collapse of previous regulatory frameworks (JCPOA) and determining a viable path forward that prevents the acquisition of nuclear weapons while respecting the sovereign rights of states regarding peaceful nuclear technology.
3. **Freedom of Navigation and Global Economic Security:** Resolving the "dual blockade" of the Strait of Hormuz. As this waterway facilitates roughly 20% of global oil and 25% of global LNG shipments, the Council must determine the parameters for lifting blockades and securing international transit passage under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
4. **International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Accountability:** Investigating the reported violations of IHL, including the targeting of civilian infrastructure and the disproportionate impact of hostilities on non-combatant populations.
5. **Post-Conflict Disarmament Architecture:** Moving beyond immediate cessation of hostilities to create a verifiable, binding, and sustainable disarmament framework,

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whether that constitutes a regional WMD-Free Zone (WMDFZ) or a revitalized verification regime.

## ***BACKGROUND INFORMATION***

Iran's nuclear programme was initiated under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1950s with American assistance under the 'Atoms for Peace' initiative. The Shah signed the NPT in 1968, expressing commitment to peaceful nuclear use. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution fundamentally altered Iran's trajectory and its relations with the West.

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), facing existential military threats, Iran revived covert research into nuclear weapons under the codename AMAD Project. Ayatollah Khomeini, who had initially opposed nuclear weapons on religious grounds, permitted limited research.

In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition group, exposed the existence of two previously undisclosed nuclear sites: a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water facility at Arak. This revelation triggered international alarm and initiated the nuclear crisis that persists to this day. In 2003, Supreme Leader Khamenei issued a fatwa (religious decree) declaring nuclear weapons 'haram' (forbidden in Islam), a declaration Iran has consistently cited to deny any weaponization intent.

### ***The IAEA Crisis and First Sanctions (2003–2010)***

Between 2003 and 2006, Iran engaged in diplomatic negotiations with the E3 (UK, France, Germany) while continuing its enrichment programme. Iran agreed to suspend enrichment temporarily but resumed activities in 2006, citing the failure of incentives offered by Western powers.

On 31 July 2006, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1696 (14-1, Qatar opposed), demanding Iran suspend all enrichment activities within 30 days and cooperate fully with the IAEA. This marked the beginning of the UN's direct sanctions architecture against Iran. Non-compliance led to successive rounds of escalating sanctions:

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**RES 1696 - 2006 - Demand for enrichment suspension, first UNSC action on Iran nuclear file**

*Vote: 14-1 (Qatar against) — NOT Chapter VII*

- Demanded Iran suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing within 30 days
- Threatened 'appropriate measures' under Article 41 if Iran failed to comply
- Did not impose sanctions at this stage, served as a final warning. Russia expressed concern the resolution could be interpreted as pre-authorizing force

**RES 1737 - 2006 - First binding sanctions resolution, Chapter VII, Article 41**

*Vote: 15-0 (Unanimous)*

- Mandatory suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
- Prohibited supply of nuclear-related materials and technology to Iran
- Asset freeze on key individuals and entities in Iran's nuclear and missile programs
- Established the '1737 Committee' to monitor sanctions implementation. Required all states to report compliance within 60 days

**RES 1747 - 2007 - Arms embargo and expanded asset freezes**

*Vote: 15-0 (Unanimous)*

- Banned Iran from transferring, importing, or exporting any conventional arms
- Extended asset freeze to additional individuals and entities
- Travel restrictions on persons connected to Iran's nuclear programme
- Urged states and international organisations to exercise restraint on business/investment in Iran. Russia agreed to support after accusing Iran of payment delinquency for Bushehr nuclear plant

**RES 1803 - 2008 - Extended inspections authority and bank monitoring**

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*Vote: 14-0-1 (Indonesia abstained)*

- Required states to inspect cargo going to/from Iran on aircraft and vessels if reasonable grounds for suspicion
- Expanded asset freeze and travel ban lists
- Called on states to exercise vigilance over Iranian banks' activities, especially Bank Melli and Bank Saderat
- Extended the 1737 Committee's oversight mandate. Indonesia abstained, while being 'not convinced of the efficacy of additional sanctions'

**RES 1835 - 2008 - Reaffirmation resolution, no new sanctions**

*Vote: 15-0 (Unanimous)*

- Reaffirmed Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803
- Notably NOT adopted under Chapter VII, no new enforcement measures
- Called on Iran to comply with IAEA and Council demands. Seen as diplomatic consolation prize amid stalled negotiations

**RES 1929 - 2010 - Most comprehensive sanctions package before JCPOA**

*Vote: 12-2-1 (Turkey and Brazil voted No; Lebanon abstained)*

- Prohibited Iran from undertaking activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons
- Banned states from providing refuelling or maintenance to Iranian vessels if carrying prohibited goods
- Extended inspections authority, required states to inspect suspicious cargo in their ports
- Authorized asset freeze on IRGC entities, first direct sanction on Iran's Revolutionary Guards
- Prevented opening of new Iranian banks abroad; banned new correspondent relationships with Iranian banks. Turkey and Brazil voted No after proposing their own Tehran Declaration alternative (supported by Iran)

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### ***The JCPOA Era***

In June 2013, Iranians elected Hassan Rouhani as president on a platform of diplomatic engagement. After approximately 20 months of intensive negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, Russia, Germany), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in Vienna on 14 July 2015.

<b>JCPOA AND IRANS CORE COMMITMENTS</b>	<b>JCPOA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS TO IRAN</b>
Reduce enriched uranium stockpile by 98% (to 300 kg) for 15 years	Lift all UN sanctions imposed under Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929
Cap enrichment at 3.67% for 10 years (far below weapons-grade 90%)	Terminate EU nuclear-related sanctions
Reduce operating centrifuges by two-thirds for 10 years	Waive US nuclear-related sanctions, release of ~\$100 billion in frozen assets
Convert Arak heavy water reactor to prevent plutonium production	Allow Iran access to international financial system
Provide IAEA inspectors access to enrichment facilities within 24 days	Restore full normalisation of Iran's economic and trade relations
Ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol for enhanced verification	Provide assistance with Iran's civilian nuclear programme

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## **RES 2231 - 2015 - JCPOA, the most complex UNSC resolution on Iran**

### ***Vote: 15-0 (Unanimous)***

- Endorsed the JCPOA and called on all parties to implement it in good faith
- Terminated all provisions of Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, and 2224
- Introduced the 'Snapback' mechanism: any JCPOA participant could trigger sanctions reimposition without a veto
- Restricted conventional arms exports to Iran for 5 years (until October 2020)
- Prohibited ballistic missile activities until October 2023 or IAEA 'Broader Conclusion,' whichever earlier
- Iran was to receive sanctions relief totalling approximately \$100 billion on Implementation Day (January 16, 2016). The Council was to 'cease' consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue by October 18, 2025

### ***The Collapse of the JCPOA***

On 8 May 2018, US President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, reimposed sanctions, and launched a 'maximum pressure' campaign. Iran remained in compliance for approximately one year, but beginning in May 2019, Iran systematically began stepping outside JCPOA limits in response to continued US sanctions, a strategy Iran called 'remedial measures' permitted under the agreement's dispute resolution mechanism.

Key milestones in JCPOA collapse:

- May 2019: Iran suspends sale of surplus enriched uranium and heavy water
- July 2019: IAEA confirms Iran breached 300 kg uranium stockpile limit and 3.67% enrichment ceiling
- January 2020: Following US assassination of IRGC General Qasem Soleimani, Iran announced it would no longer observe any JCPOA limits

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- August 2020: US invokes snapback mechanism, opposed by all other JCPOA parties as legally invalid since US had withdrawn from the agreement
  - 2021–2022: Biden administration indirect talks (Vienna rounds) fail to restore JCPOA
  - October 2022: Iran provides Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones to Russia for use in Ukraine, violating UNSC Resolution 2231 arms provisions
  - August 2025: UK, France, and Germany (E3) invoke the snapback mechanism, triggering automatic sanctions reimposition on September 27, 2025

By early 2026, Iran's uranium stockpile included over 400 kg enriched to 60% purity just short of the 90% weapons-grade threshold. The IAEA had declared Iran non-compliant with its NPT safeguards obligations for the first time in 20 years in June 2025.

### **The Twelve-Day Conundrum, June 2025**

On 12 June 2025, the IAEA declared Iran in non-compliance with nuclear obligations for the first time in two decades, citing Iran's failure to address questions about undeclared nuclear material and activities. Iran responded by announcing plans to build a new enrichment site and install advanced centrifuges.

On 13 June 2025, Israel launched large-scale military strikes across Iran, targeting nuclear facilities, missile factories, senior military officials, and nuclear scientists. The stated Israeli objective was to permanently prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

On 23 June 2025, following an Iranian missile attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (causing no casualties), the United States struck underground nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan using GBU-57 A/B 'Massive Ordnance Penetrator' bunker-buster bombs. Trump characterised this as a 'limited, one-off mission.'

A US Defense Intelligence Agency preliminary report, subsequently characterised by the Trump administration as a 'political leak', assessed that Iran had moved much of its enriched uranium stockpile before the strikes, and that the attacks had set back Iran's weapons-development capability by only months, not years.

After 12 days of fighting, a ceasefire was reached on 24 June 2025. Both Israel and Iran claimed victory. Iran threatened to withdraw from the NPT. The ceasefire held until February 2026.

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## The Road to February 28, 2026

Between April and June 2025, five rounds of US-Iran nuclear talks were held, mediated by Oman, with delegations led by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

On 25 February 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi stated that a 'historic' agreement was 'within reach.' The Omani foreign minister mediating talks described 'significant progress' — including Iran's willingness to commit to 'never, ever having nuclear material that will create a bomb.' However, Trump publicly stated he was 'not thrilled' with the talks on 27 February. On 28 February 2026, while diplomatic talks were literally ongoing, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury.

<b>US / ISRAEL DELEGATION CORE DEMANDS</b>	<b>IRAN'S CORE DEMANDS/POSITIONS</b>
Complete dismantlement of uranium enrichment programme	Inalienable right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes
Immediate handover of all enriched uranium stockpiles	Willing to limit enrichment levels but not zero-enrichment
Halt all ballistic missile development	Missiles are conventional defence, outside nuclear negotiations scope
End support for Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias	Resistance axis support is regional policy, not subject to bilateral deal
'Libya model' nuclear disarmament, full dismantlement	Khaddafi disarmed and was deposed, Iran views Libya model as fatal precedent
Unconditional IAEA access to all facilities at all times	Willing to resume IAEA access once 'internationally protected facility' protocols established after attacks

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## ***Operation Epic Fury & the sacred timeline of failed negotiations***

On February 28, 2026, while direct US-Iran nuclear negotiations were underway through Oman, the United States and Israel launched coordinated large-scale strikes on Iran. The strikes targeted: military infrastructure, ballistic missile facilities, naval assets, nuclear infrastructure, and Iranian political leadership. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the initial strike. Israeli PM Netanyahu had lobbied President Trump for a joint operation, with Israeli intelligence cited as a decisive factor. Pentagon briefers acknowledged to US congressional staff on March 1, 2026 that Iran was NOT planning to strike US forces unless attacked first, directly contradicting the White House's 'imminent threat' justification.

1. Feb 28, 2026 - US and Israel launch Operation Epic Fury against Iran. Supreme Leader Khamenei killed. Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz.
2. Feb 28, 2026 - Iran launches retaliatory missile and drone strikes on Israel, US military bases in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE, and civilian infrastructure across the Gulf.
3. Feb 28, 2026- UNSC Emergency Briefing. The US describes strikes as self-defence under Article 51. China and Russia call strikes 'unprovoked aggression.'
4. March 2, 2026 - Hezbollah fires on Israel in solidarity with Iran. Israel launches major strikes on Lebanon.
5. March 3, 2026 - Continued US-Israeli strikes on Tehran and Iranian provinces.
6. March 6, 2026 - Iranian UN Ambassador reports 1,300+ killed in Iran. An elementary school in Minab was hit, 175+ killed, mostly children. Pentagon investigating.
7. March 11, 2026 - UNSC adopts Resolution 2817 (13-0, China and Russia abstaining) - condemning Iran's strikes on Gulf states. Russia's counter-draft fails (4 in favour, 2 against, 9 abstentions).
8. March 25, 2026 - Pakistan delivers 15-point US peace proposal to Iran. Iran rejects it.

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9. March 31, 2026 - Pakistan and China jointly deliver a 5-point peace initiative.
  10. April 7-8, 2026 - Two-week ceasefire announced by Trump. Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz conditionally. Pakistan mediates. Israel bombards Lebanon hours after the ceasefire announcement.
  11. April 11, 2026 - US VP JD Vance, Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner arrive in Islamabad for the highest-level US-Iran talks since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
  12. April 16, 2026 - Separate US-mediated Lebanon-Israel ceasefire announced.
  13. April 25, 2026 - Trump cancels US envoys' trip to Islamabad. Negotiations stall.
  14. May 1, 2026 - Trump issues War Powers Resolution notification claiming hostilities 'effectively ended.'
  15. May 8-9, 2026 - Reports emerge of US 14-point MoU framework being close to agreement. Iran's nuclear enrichment programme remains the core sticking point. The Strait of Hormuz remains partially closed, 'dual blockade' between US naval forces and Iranian mining/drone threats.

## **RES 2817 - 2026 - Condemns Iran's attacks on Gulf states**

*Vote: 13-0 (China, Russia abstained) | 135 co-sponsors, largest ever for a UNSC resolution*

- Condemned 'in the strongest terms' Iran's attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Jordan
- Demanded immediate cessation of all Iranian attacks on GCC member states
- Condemned threats to close or obstruct international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz
- Deplored targeting of civilian objects and civilian casualties
- Did NOT mention the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, criticised by China, Russia, and Iran as 'one-sided'
- India co-sponsored, citing energy security, diaspora safety, and international law principles

- Pakistan voted in favour but called the resolution 'biased and one-sided in tone'
- China abstained, saying the resolution 'does not fully reflect the root cause and overall picture'. Russia abstained, warned the resolution 'could be interpreted by bad-faith actors to continue acts of aggression against Iran'

***CHARTER FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE IN THE COMMITTEE***

<b>Article and Provision</b>	<b>Usage in the context of agenda</b>
<b>Article 2(4), Prohibition on use of force</b>	US and Israel's strikes on Iran without UNSC authorisation likely violate this provision. Iran invokes it. The US invokes Article 51 as an exception.
<b>Article 2(7), Non-interference in domestic affairs</b>	Iran cites this against US calls for regime change and targeting of its political leadership.
<b>Article 25, Member state obligation to comply with Council decisions</b>	All UN members must implement UNSC resolutions. Iran's non-compliance with nuclear resolutions created a legal basis for sanctions. US veto immunity raises enforcement asymmetry concerns.
<b>Article 33, Peaceful settlement of disputes</b>	Parties to a dispute shall first seek peaceful means including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement. The mid-negotiation strike by US/Israel arguably violates the spirit of this article.
<b>Article 39 (Chapter VII), Threat or</b>	The UNSC must determine whether the

<b>breach of peace</b>	conflict constitutes a threat to peace before invoking enforcement powers. Resolution 2817 stops short of this determination regarding the US/Israeli strikes.
<b>Article 41, Non-military enforcement measures</b>	Economic sanctions, arms embargoes, communications severances. All prior Iran sanctions (1696-2231) imposed under this article.
<b>Article 42, Military enforcement measures</b>	Use of armed force by UNSC authorisation as a last resort.
<b>Article 51, Right of self-defence</b>	Both the US/Israel AND Iran invoke this. US claims pre-emptive self-defence citing nuclear threat. Iran claims self-defence against ongoing strikes.
<b>Article 103, Charter supremacy</b>	UN Charter obligations prevail over all other international agreements. This makes UNSC decisions binding over bilateral or multilateral treaties.

**Article 51 states: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.'**

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## **The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Framework**

The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, has three pillars: (1) Non-proliferation, nuclear weapon states shall not transfer weapons; non-nuclear states shall not acquire them. (2) Disarmament, nuclear weapon states commit to good-faith disarmament negotiations. (3) Peaceful use. all states have an 'inalienable right' to peaceful nuclear technology.

Iran has signed and ratified the NPT. It has consistently maintained that its nuclear programme falls under the 'peaceful use' pillar. Iran also argues that nuclear-armed states (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and de facto Israel) have failed to fulfil their Article VI disarmament obligations, making selective enforcement against non-nuclear states hypocritical. Israel, notably, has never signed the NPT and is believed to possess 80–300 nuclear warheads.

## **International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Considerations**

The conflict raises serious IHL concerns under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols:

- Principle of Distinction: Parties must distinguish between combatants/military objectives and civilians/civilian objects. The Minab elementary school strike (175+ killed, mostly children), regardless of attribution, constitutes a potential war crime.
- Principle of Proportionality: Even legitimate military strikes must not cause civilian casualties 'excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.'
- Principle of Precaution: Parties must take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm. Striking nuclear sites in densely populated areas without adequate warning raises precaution concerns.
- Assassination of heads of state: The targeted killing of Supreme Leader Khamenei, while not explicitly prohibited in IHL, raises questions under customary international law and the UN Charter's respect for state sovereignty.
- Strait of Hormuz blockade: Both Iran's mining/closure of the Strait and the US naval counter-blockade of Iranian ports may violate the 1982 UNCLOS Convention on

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freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage.

## The Strait of Hormuz



The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil and 25% of global LNG passes, is legally classified as an 'international strait used for international navigation' under Part III of UNCLOS (1982). Under UNCLOS Article 38, all vessels and aircraft enjoy the right of 'transit passage' through such straits, which cannot be suspended. Iran is a party to UNCLOS.

Iran has claimed sovereignty over portions of the Strait and has periodically threatened closure. The US position is that any closure constitutes an act of war and a violation of international law. However, the US itself is NOT a party to UNCLOS. Multiple international law scholars have argued that Iran mining the Strait constitutes a violation of UNCLOS and customary international law; simultaneously, the US naval blockade of Iranian ports may constitute an act of war under the UN Charter.

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## ***QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER - QARMA***

Delegates are reminded that a resolution is only as strong as its technical and political feasibility. To transition the region from the current state of conflict to a durable peace, your proposals must provide definitive, actionable answers to the following four strategic inquiries.

### **1. Beyond "JCPOA 2.0"**

How can the Security Council design a nuclear framework that caps enrichment at 3.67% and mandates "Anytime, Anywhere" IAEA verification, while simultaneously providing the durable, binding assurances necessary to satisfy Iran's existential security concerns? Delegates must move beyond simply repeating the 2015 JCPOA. You must propose mechanisms to ensure the agreement survives unilateral withdrawals or political shifts. How can this committee guarantee compliance in a climate of total institutional distrust?

### **2. The "Libya Model"**

The Dilemma: To what extent is the "Libya Model", the total, irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear infrastructure, a viable diplomatic objective? Given that Iranian leadership views nuclear technology as an existential prerequisite for state survival, what quid pro quo or security guarantee is sufficient to mitigate the perceived risk of regime change? If the committee pursues full dismantlement, you must articulate the specific security guarantees that would make such a concession politically palatable to Tehran without appearing as a surrender to Western pressure.

### **3. The WMDFZ Impasse**

Is a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) a practical solution to the current hostilities, or does it invite further gridlock? How can the Council bridge the fundamental impasse regarding Israel's undeclared nuclear deterrent versus Iran's demand for regional strategic parity? Delegates must determine if a disarmament resolution can effectively incorporate non-NPT signatories. Is it possible to construct a regional framework that respects the unique security requirements of all Gulf actors, or will this demand inevitably lead to a P5

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veto?

#### **4. Third-Party Solutions**

Could a "Third-Party Custody" framework, in which enriched materials are removed from Iranian soil and held in secure, neutral facilities serve as a functional technical middle ground? This proposal shifts the burden of non-proliferation from Iran to Third-Party Custodians. Delegates must debate: Does this framework create new, unacceptable geopolitical dependencies? Under what UN legal mandate would these third-party nations hold such materials, and what happens if the custodian violates the trust of the Council?

#### ***AGENDA EXPECTATIONS TO BE ACHIEVED***

By the conclusion of the committee, delegates are expected to move beyond the current state of conflict toward a structured, binding diplomatic outcome. The following benchmarks are the primary goals for any successful resolution:

- **Establishment of a Durable Ceasefire:** Transitioning from the current intermittent, fragile truces (such as the April 2026 arrangements) to a permanent, monitored cessation of hostilities. This must include clear mechanisms for de-escalation and the prevention of further "pre-emptive" strikes.
- **Restoration of Maritime Security:** Providing a binding framework to lift the "dual blockade" of the Strait of Hormuz. Delegates should aim to authorize a neutral or internationalized maritime monitoring body to ensure the right of transit passage and guarantee the flow of global energy supplies.
- **Verification of Nuclear Commitments:** Defining a post-conflict verification regime. Since previous IAEA access is fragmented, delegates must establish how to monitor current enrichment levels and ensure that all nuclear infrastructure remains strictly dedicated to civilian use, potentially incorporating the "Third-Party Custody" model.
- **Humanitarian Accountability:** Defining a mechanism to address the humanitarian impact of the conflict. This includes establishing an independent commission to

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investigate violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), specifically targeting the protection of civilian infrastructure (such as schools and energy facilities) as highlighted by the Minab incident.

### ***TOPICS FOR MODERATED CAUCUSES***

1. Applying the *Caroline* Test to evaluate the legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes under Article 51.
2. Defining the threshold of "imminence" to prevent the unilateral abuse of the right to self-defense.
3. Establishing UNSC-mandated evidentiary standards for invoking Article 51 against non-state actors.
4. Analyzing the legality of targeting leadership nodes (decapitation strikes) under International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
5. The conflict between Article 2(4) territorial integrity and current regional military engagement strategies.
6. Addressing the erosion of Article 25 (member state compliance) due to frequent P5 vetoes.
7. Designing a post-IAEA, UNSC-led nuclear monitoring framework for Iran.
8. Evaluating the feasibility of third-party (Russia/China) custody of Iranian enriched fissile materials.
9. Constructing a "Security-for-Sovereignty" grand bargain: Verifiable non-proliferation for binding security guarantees.
10. The role of a regional Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) as a long-term stabilization tool.
11. Addressing the "Dual-Use" technology dilemma in civil nuclear programs under the NPT.
12. Creating a phased, reciprocal disarmament roadmap to replace the collapsed JCPOA structure.
13. Establishing a multinational, neutral maritime task force to end the dual-blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.